Abstract-The use of role engineering has grown in importance with the expansion of highly abstracted access control frameworks in organizations. In particular, the use of role mining techniques for the discovery of roles from previously deployed authorizations has facilitated the configuration of such frameworks. However, the literature lacks from a clear basis for appraising and leveraging the learning outcomes of the role mining process. In this paper, we provide such a formal basis. We compare sets of roles by projecting roles from one set into the other set. This approach allows to measure how comparable the two configurations of roles are, and to interpret each role. We formally define the problem of comparing sets of roles, and prove that the problem is NP-complete. Then, we propose an algorithm to map the inherent relation among the sets based on algebraic expressions. We demonstrate the correctness and completeness of our solution, and investigate some further issues that may benefit from our approach, such as detection of unhandled perturbations or source misconfiguration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Access control is a security fundamental concern which covers a wide area of applications including operating systems, database systems, enterprise resource planning systems, and workflow systems. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [1] [2] is the dominant model for access control in both commercial and research fields. It structures into roles the concrete agents who have access requirements to secured objects, such as employees, programs, or processors. A role can be viewed from two perspectives: a set of authorizations that are recurrently assigned together, or a set of agents that are granted the same set of authorizations. As RBAC platforms have become essential to large enterprises, the major difficulty is still the configuration and establishment of the RBAC model into a functional state in the organization.
Role engineering is the practical discipline of implementing the RBAC model into organizations. Essentially, role engineering is the process of structuring the different agents of an organization into roles, and the association of the corresponding set of authorizations to every role. Topdown and bottom-up are the two common strategies in order to apply role engineering. Under the top-down approach, the roles are defined by carefully analyzing the business process associated with the organization, and decomposing it into smaller units in a functionally independent manner. Under the bottom-up approach, roles emerge from existing configurations of authorizations already deployed over the organization. The role engineering task is extremely time consuming and costly [3] . For this reason, the use of 'automatic' bottom-up role engineering techniques is growing in importance. These techniques get inspiration from data mining techniques, hence, they are known as role mining (RM). Several efficient role mining algorithms have been proposed in the literature [4] . However, they still require intensive human interpretation before leading to appropriate results. To the best of our knowledge, no efficient solutions have been proposed to assist a security administrator in the task of leveraging the outcomes of a role mining process. Moreover, as the years pass since the wide adoption of RBAC in organizations, a new requirement is strongly emerging. In addition to the traditional application of role engineering upon organizations where there is only a direct user-permission assignment framework, we may also need to apply role engineering in organizations where a pre-existing RBAC configuration exists but is no longer optimized. This may happen because the RBAC configuration is getting old and recurrently updated, or does not fit the dynamic nature of the organization anymore. In such cases, keeping as close as possible to the original RBAC configuration is the proper optimization criteria of existing role mining strategies [5] . In this regard, the ability of mapping the outcomes of a role mining process to the set of original authorizations may be highly beneficial in order to understand and validate the discovery process, as well as to detect unhandled perturbations over the deployed configurations, or misconfiguration within the original ones. Similarly, we also rise the necessity of comparing the outcomes of two different role mining processes. Indeed, several role mining tools have been proposed in the literature. Each new role mining technique needs to be tested and evaluated before being commercialized and used in real configurations. The test stage usually consists of running the role mining algorithm on real and synthetic concrete data, generated from already known consistent RBAC state. The RBAC state obtained from the role mining is then compared to the original RBAC state, in a reverse engineering manner. However, we do not find any analytic comparison tool between the two RBAC configurations of roles in the literature. Thus, an automatic matching tool between roles from two sets is obviously needed, either for the assessment of the role mining methods, or for the interpretation of the mined roles.
In this paper, we formally define the problem of comparing two sets of roles according to the underlined requirements extracted from the literature. We demonstrate that the problem is NP-complete. We present a greedy solution that handles the motivation problem. Then, we prove the correctness and completeness of the solution. We define a sufficient condition that guarantees preciseness of the comparison between the original set of roles and mined set of roles. The experimental results confirm the validity of our approach, as a beneficial solution to analyze and better understand the set of mined roles when an original set of roles exists. Paper organization. Section II reviews some technical definitions about the RBAC model and role mining problem and its algebraic representation. Section III formally defines the problem to solve. Section IV presents our solution to the problem, underlines some of the properties of our solution, and elaborates on some heuristics to enhance our approach. Section V presents experimental results. Section VI provides a comparison with related work. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the background about the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model. In addition, we state a formulation of the role mining problem, and introduce the algebraic presentation of the involved data in role mining.
A. Role Based Access Control Model
The RBAC model is a NIST standard. It introduces the notion of "role" in order to make the access control system more compact and comprehensive, compared to the direct user-permission assignments. Definition 1 presents the basic model RBAC 0 [2] 
} , the mapping of role onto a set of users
the mapping of role onto a set of permissions B. The Role Mining Problem
Intuitively, role mining is the process of extracting a configuration of roles from a discretionary user permission assignment relation. The users granted with similar permissions are structured into similar roles. Symmetrically, permissions with common users are assigned together, so that they belong to the same roles. Optionally, some information about the business process or the user attributes may be provided, and then it is a hybrid role mining. Nevertheless, there is no consensus about the formal role mining problem definition. Several role mining techniques are proposed in literature, with different assumptions and optimization criteria leading to different solutions. For instance, the first explicit formal definition for the role mining problem is given in [6] . Vaidya et al. suggest the minimization of the number of generated roles as an optimization criteria, and show that this problem is NP-complete. The inference role mining problem presented by Frank et al. [7] focuses on the problem from a general perspective. In all cases, role mining assumes implicitly that an underlying RBAC configuration exists in the deployed authorizations, and aims to reveal this underlying configuration. Definition 2 provides a unified view of both bottom-up and hybrid role mining. Unlike other definitions, it does not give the function to optimize, i.e. the precise way to solve the problem. Therefore, to validate that the problem is solved, we must know the underlying RBAC configuration * . We can compare the set of mined roles with the set of original roles in experimental scenarios, as well as in application scenarios where an old RBAC configuration exists.
Algebraic Representation of the Problem: To unify the representation of the inputs and outputs of role mining, the involved entities are represented with boolean matrices as follows: given users, permissions and roles (i.e., 1 In the original NIST standard is defined as 
III. ROLE SET COMPARISON PROBLEM

A. Motivation
The requirement of comparing two sets of roles occurs in several use cases related to role mining. The first use case is the assessment of role mining algorithms. An algorithm designer usually evaluates the performance of its RM algorithm with the reverse engineering technique: starting from an RBAC configuration, apply role mining over the resulting , and compare the obtained roles with the original roles. Likewise, we can compare the outputs of several role mining algorithms to test their performance under different constraints. The second use case is the enforcement of role mining results. A security administrator can require assistance toward migrating to a new RBAC configuration from an old RBAC configuration. A similar application is migrating from discretionary to an RBAC configuration. Considering the set of permissions of each user as a pseudo-role, the administrator may need assistance to assign each user to the appropriate roles which guarantee the required permissions. A mapping of the pseudo-roles with the obtained new RBAC roles may solve the problem.
In almost all the above mentioned cases, we have typically a set of roles of reference or original roles OR and a set of mined roles MR. The first set is a set of mastered roles since they are well known by the security administrator, in opposition to the set of new roles MR. The two configurations of roles are defined for the same set of discretionary security rules . However, they may have been calculated with respect to different constraints. For instance, one set can correspond to a hierarchical structure of roles whereas the other is flat. Similarly, the roles of one set may be partially overlapping whereas the roles of the other set are orthogonal.
Role mining algorithms usually output a list of roles, possibly overlapping or even redundant which means that a role can be fully covered by a union of another subset of roles from the same list. When migrating to a new RBAC configuration, the security administrator is confronted to such a list of new roles, and he has to assign them to the users and manage them to suit the organization's evolutive requirements. The administrator has to respect three access control rules: provisioning, security and maintainability. For provisioning, each user should have access in the new configuration of roles to all its privileges in the old one. For that, the administrator needs to know how to optimally cover the permissions provided by each role from OR using roles from MR. Security consists of not allowing any user to access extra-privileges. For this purpose, the administrator needs to ensure that the new assigned roles to the users do not exceed the privileges provided by their old roles. Finally, the maintainability aims to make simple and safe the evolution of the structure of roles by adding and retrieving permissions and users to the roles, according to the evolving requirements of the organization. One key characteristic to ensure the maintainability is mastering the configuration of roles. Thus, the security administrator, who masters the old roles or the old , would be very interested in leveraging his experience with the old roles in order to master the new configuration of roles more quickly. Unfortunately, mapping the new roles with the old ones manually is not a viable task. It is essential then to assist the security administrator with automated tools to analytically understand the new roles. In particular, assistance is needed to find where the permissions of an old role has been distributed in the new configuration of roles, especially when moving between a flat role structure and a hierarchical role structure. In addition, such tool may help to find how to optimally assign the permissions to the users without adding extrapermissions using the new roles.
B. Problem Statement
The problem addressed in this paper is formally stated as follows:
Definition 4. Role Set Comparison Problem Given two sets of roles OR and MR, both defined onto the same set of permissions , find for each role R in OR a minimal Disjunctive Normal Form DNF of roles in MR, such that DNF is included in R, and DNF maximally covers the permissions of R. By minimal DNF we mean that the size then the number of conjunctive clauses in the DNF are minimized.
Definition 4 proposes to express each role from OR with an algebraic formula of mined roles. The formula is presented as a disjunction of conjunctions of mined roles, i.e. a Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) expression. The structure of a DNF fits naturally the requirement of projecting a role from OR in MR. The permissions of the role are divided into several roles in MR or gathered with other roles in a larger role, or both. Thus may be expressed by a combination of unions of roles and/or intersections of roles. The conjunctions express hierarchical relationships: when the role becomes an intersection of roles in the new configuration MR, this means that the projection in MR of or of a subset of it is a super role. Moreover, the use of negation of roles in combination with conjunction aims to retrieve a role from a role expressing exceptions. The disjunctions accumulate and cover the permissions of when they are spread in MR. The problem also states that the DNF should still be included in . This condition guarantees the security rule, and avoid assigning extraprivileges to the users. Symmetrically, the problem states that the coverage of the permissions should be maximized since the purpose is to understand the projection of the role in the new configuration. This is an approximation problem since the exact DNF can not always be found because of role mining errors, exceptions and shadowed roles. This issue is handled in the next section more in depth. The existence of the exact DNF matching, and the complexity of the DNF, are good indications about whether the two sets of roles are comparable or not. Besides, there may be different possibilities of DNF from MR to maximally cover a given role . In such case, we find the DNF which involves less conjunctions of roles in order to reduce the size of the obtained hierarchical relationships. In a second stage, we also minimize the number of clauses. Finally, we note that the comparison is intended to be from original roles to mined roles, but it obviously can be done in the opposite way.
C. Complexity
We demonstrate that the problem stated in Definition 4 is NP-complete. We first decompose the problem considering the comparison of one role to a set of roles, and then we reformulate it as a decision problem, in order to apply the NP Completeness theory.
Definition 5. Role-to-Role Set Comparison Decision Problem Given a role R and a set of roles MR, defined onto the same set of permissions , and given two integers and , is there a Disjunctive Normal Form DNF of roles from MR, with less than literals per clause and less than clauses, such that DNF equals R?
To prove that the problem is NP-complete, we show that:
1) The problem is NP.
2) There exists another known NP-complete problem, any instance of which can be reduced in a polynomial time to an instance of our problem, such that resolving our problem infers resolving the other problem. Proof: First, the problem is NP since checking the validity of a solution, i.e. calculating the set of permissions of a DNF and comparing it with R and counting the number of clauses and the number of literals in each clause, can be done in a polynomial time. Second, the set covering problem can be reduced to our problem. The universe U is assimilated to the role R. The family of subsets S is projected to the set of roles MR, which are sets of permissions. The size of the cover is the same as the size of the DNF , and we set to 1. We get a special case of the Role-to-Role Set Comparison Problem, where all the roles of MR are included in R. Resolving this instance of the Role-to-Role Set Comparison Problem implies finding a DNF in MR, that maximally covers R with the minimal number of clauses and no conjunction at all. It infers finding a minimal cover for the universe U in S if such a cover exists. The transformation is obviously polynomial since it is a one to one mapping.
IV. ROLE SET COMPARISON SOLUTION
In this section we provide an algorithm to solve the Role Set Comparison Problem. Afterwards, we analyze some important properties of our algorithm, and show its relevance in the context of role mining.
A. The Algorithm
Algorithm 1 is a greedy algorithm which solves the Role Set Comparison Problem. The algorithm takes as input two sets of roles, and gives as output, for each role R in the first set setR1, an algebraic expression formulated as a generalized union of intersections of roles taken in the second set of roles setR2 and their negations. The obtained expression, denoted DNF, is equal to R if any possibility to construct such an expression exists among setR2. Otherwise, it is the best approximation of R included in it
The universe of literals which can be used to build the DNF is CandidateRoles, containing all the roles in setR2 in addition to the negation of each of them (line 1). The algorithm is structured in two main nested loops. The first one is a for loop which handles the roles of setR1 sequentially. For each role, we create a variable DNF which will contain the solution and a vector called UncoveredPerms initialized to the whole set of permissions of R (line 3-4). This vector indicates the current coverage of the permissions of the role R gradually with the temporary values of DNF during the progress of Algorithm 1. The second main loop is a while loop (line 9-33). It checks all the possibilities Algorithm 1 Compare(setR1,setR2) Input: nRoles1×nPerms reference role-permission relation setR1 Input: nRoles2×nPerms compared role-permission relation setR2 Output: a DNF of roles from setR2 for each role in setR1.
The DNF is equal to the role, or the closest included possible one if equality is not possible. 1: CandidateRoles ← setR2 ∪¬setR2 2: for each role R in setR1 do 3: UncoveredPerms ← R while ¬RIsCovered and CandidateClauses ∕ = ∅ do 10: for each clause C in CandidateClauses do 11: if ¬RIsCovered then 12: if C ⊆ R then 13: if C ∩ UncoveredPerms ∕ = ∅ then 14: DNF ← DNF ∪ C for each clause C' in GeneratedClauses do 4: if C ⊂ C' then 5: remove C' from GeneratedClauses 
B. Running Example
We consider the following configurations of roles defined onto = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7}. The first set of roles contains only one role setR1= {R = {p1, p2, p5, p6, p7}}. The second set is setR2 ={r1= {p1, p2}, r2={p1, p3}, r3={p3, p5, p6, p7}}. Since setR1 contains only one role, the main for loop (line 2-35) runs only one time. So we focus on the rest of Algorithm 1. First of all, the candidate literals are CandidateRoles = { 1, 2, 3, ¬ 1, ¬ 2, ¬ 3} (line 1). After the initialization step (line 3-8), we get: UncoveredPerms = R; DNF = {}; CandidateClauses = CandidateRoles; DiscardedClauses = {}; RIsCovered = False; and ConjunctiveClauseLevel = 1, which means that we will first try to cover R using disjunctions of roles from setR2. In the first iteration of the while loop (line 9-33) of Algorithm 1: We enter the for loop (line 10-28) which tests the clauses in CandidateClauses one by one. Only the clause r1 is included in R, and satisfies the conditions of line 12 and line 13. Thus, {r1} is added to DNF, and UncoveredPerms is updated to {p5, p6, p7} (line [14] [15] .
At the end of the for loop (line 10-28), since the value of RIsCovered is still False, the number of literals per clause ConjunctiveClauseLevel is increased to 2, meaning that we will test the clauses of disjunctions of two literals next. Algorithm 2 is called to generate a new set of clauses (line 30-31) . The result of this call is CandidateClauses={ 2∩ 3, 2∩¬ 1, 2∩¬ 3, 3∩¬ 1, 3∩¬ 2, ¬ 1∩¬ 2, ¬ 1∩¬ 3, ¬ 2 ∩ ¬ 3}. It is all the combinations of conjunction of two roles from CandidateRoles, minus the clauses involving DiscardedClauses. We notice that r1 does not take part in any of the candidate clauses, since it is a discarded clause now. We also exclude the clauses involving a role and its negation because it is the empty set. In the second iteration of the while loop (line 9-33) of Algorithm 1: the for loop (line 10-28) tests the new set of CandidateClauses one by one again. The first clause to pass the test in line 12 (inclusion in R) is 3 ∩ ¬ 2. This clause covers all the remaining UncoveredPerms. So DNF is updated to {{ 1}, { 3, ¬ 2}} which is interpreted: DNF = 1 ∪ ( 3 ∩ ¬ 2) i.e. R is the association of r1 and r3 minus r2. UncoveredPerms is updated to ∅ (line 15), and so RIsCovered is set to true (line 17). The for loop (line 19-23) checks that the new added clause does not cover the previously added clauses to DNF, in order to remove the obsolete clauses. There will be no further loops and no further generation of clauses of conjunction of higher number of literals because RIsCovered is set to true.
C. Properties of Algorithm 1
Theorem 2. Correctness. For each role R in OR, the returned DNF is included or equal to R.
Proof: Lines 12 and 13 of Algorithm 1 guarantee that the DNF is always a subset of or equal to R. Proof: Since the two configurations of roles are equivalent, the users which have exactly the permissions of the role R in common, must have exactly the same permissions in the two RBAC configurations. Let the roles assigned to user in RP2 be referred as , from 1 to , where is the number of roles assigned to the user in RP2. Then we have:
. R is the intersection of the permissions of the users , from 1 to , thus it can
, which is a Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) of roles from RP2. Using the generalization of the Morgan's law [8] , we can transform the obtained CNF to a DNF.
Shadowing Detection in Role Configuration:
We combine the results from Theorems 3 and 5 and conclude that in the case of role mining without errors, Algorithm 1 finds for each role from one set (OR or MR) a DNF of roles from the other set which exactly matches with it, Unless the condition mentioned in Theorem 5 (there exists a subset of users such that ∩ =1 ( ) = ) is not satisfied. Moreover, this condition is closely related with the concept of role. Indeed, a role can be viewed as a set of permissions assigned together to a set of users. Thus, if Algorithm 1 does not find an exact matching DNF for a given role in a context of role mining, this can be interpreted as a possible misconfiguration of that role. The first possibility is that the User Role assignment is incomplete, which means that this role did not have been assigned to any user yet. For instance, a job position has been created but the affected employee is not hired yet. The second possibility is that some permissions of the role are shadowed by other roles. That is to say, the role overlaps some permissions with other roles, and is always assigned to a user together with at least one of these overlapping roles. The common permissions can underline then a misconfiguration of the role or a non optimal hierarchization in the structure of roles. In both cases, it is relevant to warn the security administrator. We note that this condition is independent of the used role mining technique.
A Similarity Metric: The result of Algorithm 1 can be leveraged to obtain a similarity metric between two sets of roles. Indeed, we can sum the distances between each role from setR1 and its DNF, with distance(R,DNF) = ( , ) ( ) . The obtained distance, divided by the number of roles nRoles1 is an indicator of how well the set setR1 is represented in setR2.
D. Time Complexity of Algorithm 1
The time complexity of Algorithm 1 depends on both the size and the nature of the input data. If the inputs are two sets of roles of size roles and roles respectively, then the worst case complexity is O( × 4 ). The worst case is when the two sets of roles are not comparable, which means that for each role in setR1 there is no DNF of roles from setR2 which exactly matches it. The algorithm will test all the possible configurations of disjunction of conjunction of roles in setR2, and the output will be only an approximation of the roles. The best case complexity is O( ×2 ), when the two sets of roles are identical. We note that the complexity is independent of the number of permissions and users.
E. Heuristic to Reduce the Complexity
Algorithm 1 solves an NP-complete problem. The worst case complexity is high. However, since we intend to use the algorithm in a context of role mining where the roles are comparable, we expect that the exact matching for each role will be found at a low level of ConjunctiveClauseLevel. Otherwise, we can guess that no matching DNF can be found for the handled role. Thus, we can limit the ConjunctiveClauseLevel by setting a threshold,in order to avoid that the algorithm explores all the further combinations.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented a random RBAC configuration generator to get synthetic data for our experiments. This tool takes as input the characteristics of an RBAC configuration, notably the number of users, the number of permissions and the number of roles. In addition, it uses two parameters: the density of the user-role relation , and the density of the role-permission relation . The outputs are the three boolean matrices , , and where = ⊗ . We generate eight data sets with different sizes described in Table I with density set to 0.1. We implement the test plateform in MATLAB R2011a. All the experiments have been made with a 2.26 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor on Mac OS X V 10.7.2. The results of the experiments are summarized in Figure 1 . n  nUsers  nPerms  nOR  1  10  15  4  2  18  25  8  3  25  30  12  4  35  40  16  5  200  350  20  6  400  500  30  7  500  800  40  8  600  1000  50   Table I  SIZE OF RBAC DATA SETS. First, we use the data sets 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Table I for role mining tests. We provide the matrix of each data set as input to a given role mining algorithm, and we compare the original roles in with the mined roles in * using the Algorithm 1. We test three different role mining algorithms. We adapt two techniques of matrix compression usually used in data mining, namely the Non Negative Matrix Factorization (NNMF) [9] and the Binary Non-Orthogonal Decomposition (BNOF) [10] . Both techniques take an matrix from a data set and give an approximative decomposition of the matrix into the product of two matrices of lower rank, namely and . This is done by emphasizing the frequent patterns in the original matrix, which can be interpreted as roles in the context of role mining. However, the two techniques differ in their constraints and optimization objective. NNMF gives a factorization into two integer non negative matrices, while minimizing the root-mean-squared. We transform the obtained positive matrices into boolean matrices. BNOF uses another decomposition technique which gives a boolean decomposition of overlapping roles, but a user can be assigned to only one role. The results of this first series of tests with NNMF and BNOF are given in Figure 1 (a) and (b) . The purpose is to observe the behavior of Algorithm 1 when comparing two sets of roles which have been configured with different objectives. All role mining processes presented in this paper have finished without approximation errors. The number of original roles rise from 4 to 16, but the number of mined roles with NNMF and BNOF is slightly different from the number of original roles. In Figure 1 (a) , we plot the execution time of Algorithm 1 in function of the number of mined roles because, as stated in the section IV-D, the complexity of the algorithm mainly depends on this latter parameter. The execution time increases with the number of mined roles. Besides, the curve of the role mined with BNOF shows an exponential increase in the 4th data set in point (19 mined roles, 253 s). This is because there is an original role for which no exact DNF can be calculated. This role is shadowed in the original configuration of roles. Thus, Algorithm 1 reaches the worst complexity case for this data set. The execution time does not only depend on the number of mined roles, but it is mostly dependent of We notice a correlation between the size of the DNFs and the execution time. In particular, the execution time grows with the maximum number of conjunctions in the DNFs, which rises from one to three in this series of tests.
The third role mining algorithm we use is a Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) algorithm [11] . Considering the users as objects, and the permissions as their attributes, FCA calculates a lattice of all the possible formal concepts. We consider each Formal concept as a mined role. Role Mining algorithms in literature usually process to a pruning of the lattice to discard a subset of the concepts with regard to some optimization criteria, but in this paper, we keep all the concepts. This explains the high number of mined roles rising from 7 to 123 in Figure 1 (c) and (d), corresponding to sets of original roles of only 4 to 16 roles. Our purpose is to test the ability of Algorithm 1 to compare a hierarchical configuration of roles with a flat configuration of roles. We aim also at testing the scalability of Algorithm 1 in such cases. The results in Figure 1 (c) and (d) show that the algorithm execution time scales well with the number of mined roles, where all the roles can match their exact DNFs. This is also explained by the fact that the average size of the obtained DNFs is still between 1 and 2, meaning that Algorithm 1 succeeds in matching the original roles with the appropriate roles in the hierarchical configuration of roles. Actually, the size of the DNFs varies between 1 to 6, and the number of conjunctions does not exceed three roles, which is an intelligible amount of data that can be managed by a security administrator.
Finally, we use the remaining last four sets of data in Table I , to test the ability of Algorithm 1 to perform a user to role assignment. We provide as input both the (which may be considered as pseudo-roles as explained previously), and the set of roles generated by the random generator. The results are given in Figure 1 (e) and (f). Figure 1 (e) shows that the algorithm scales well with large data sets, since the execution time does not exceed 9 seconds. All the users are assigned to their appropriate roles, and the average size of the DNFs presented in Figure 1 (f) going up to 11 roles is simply the average number of roles assigned to each user, since no conjunctions has been involved in the generated DNFs in all the four tests.
VI. RELATED WORK
Research on role mining has revealed different requirements for the comparison of roles. Several propositions in this field have been presented.
In [12] , Kuhlmann et al. address the problem by counting how many of the roles lying in the original reference set are exactly the same to those discovered by their proposed role mining method. Similarly, Vaidya et al. in [13] consider the average, instead of the total number, of original roles that are exactly discovered by their role mining technique, as an evaluation metric for role mining. Thus, their metric provides means to compare different role mining approaches, being not influenced by the number of roles, and giving a similarity of one for total coincidence, and zero for total difference. The main drawback of these two first metrics is that they discard roles that are very similar but not exactly the same than roles in the original role set.
Hassan Takabi et al. in [14] , consider the case in which an initial RBAC configuration is upgraded during the role mining process. The similarity between roles is one of the two optimization criteria used by their role mining approach, the minimality of the resulting number of roles being the second criteria. In order to address similar issues, Vaidya et al. propose in [5] a series of similarity and dissimilarity metrics based on the Jaccard Coefficient and Jaccard Distance.
Their metrics have been recurrently used in the literature to compare roles and sets of roles; and to evaluate role mining algorithms [4] . However, these Jaccard-based measurements still suffer from an important limitation: it computes role similarity with respect to only one role in the compared set, and the same role may be used to be compared with several roles from the other set. Moreover, as a quality performance criteria, it may artificially be affected by reference sets with a high number of closely similar roles.
Alternatively, P. Streich et al. [15] propose a one-to-one matching for the comparison of two sets, based on the average Hamming distance. Their method outputs a single permutation of all roles for the second set, that gives a oneto-one mapping between the same number of roles kept in the first set. This avoids the drawback of the previous proposition of mapping independently many discovered roles to the same original role. However, the method is not specifically designed for role mining applications, but for clustering in general. We think that the Hamming distance is not appropriate for role-to-role distance measure. In fact, it does not take into account the similarity of the roles, but only the difference. More recently, Molloy et al. [16] has proposed a one-to-one mapping between the roles from two sets, also based on the Jaccard Coefficient. In order to evaluate the role stability in the presence of noise as defined in [17] , they compare the two sets of roles generated by role mining over noisy data, and clean data. They assimilate the role mapping problem to a bipartite matching optimization problem known as The Minimum Weighted Bipartite Matching Problem (MWBM). The solution contains the closest pairwise matching by maximizing the global similarity metric, with means that each role in SR1 is matched with only one role in SR2, such that the sum of the distances is minimized. But this similarity measure is still straightforward. In general, we may wish to define similarity between sets of roles in a much more sophisticated fashion. For example, note that all the above measures still assume that a role can only be mapped to another role. In general, this is not true. For example, let us assume that one set has the role R1 = (p1,p2,p3) and the other set has the roles {R1 =(p1), R2=(p2,p3)}. While the Jaccard measure will give a score of 0.33 and 0.66 respectively for the roles R2 and R3, and while the bi-partite mapping will choose to match R1 to R3 and discard R2, it is clear that taken together, the sets of roles are quite similar.
The previous work only focuses on the issue of comparing two sets of roles from the perspective of finding a similarity metric and reduces the problem to a simple pairwise role to role mapping. Morover, it fails to provide an accurate comparison of two sets of roles synthetically. In this paper, we consider the problem of comparing two sets of roles from a new perspective. Our approach allows a semantic analysis of the resulting set of mined roles in comparison with the preexisting set of roles, and the detection of misconfiguration of roles. We provide a tool that, beyond being indicative about how comparable two sets of roles are, can assist a security administrator in the comprehension of the mined roles and their enforcement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The comparison of two configurations of roles is an important issue in the research and the application of Role Based Access Control, particularly with the accession of the role mining techniques. In this paper, we have provided a formal approach to handle the problem of comparing two sets of roles. We have stated the Role Set Comparison Problem (RSCP) as the problem of finding for each role in one set an expression of a disjunctive normal form of roles from the other set. We have demonstrated that RSCP is NP-complete. Afterwards, we have presented a greedy algorithm which solves it. We have proved the correctness and the completeness of the comparison algorithm. We have also defined a relevant condition (Constrained Completeness Guarantee) to compare sets of roles representing the same access control relation and detect some role misconfiguration issues. We have evaluated the time complexity of our algorithm. Finally, we have presented some experimental results which validate the efficiency of our algorithm in comparing configurations of roles defined with different criteria, such as structured and non structured hierarchies of roles. We have also tested the algorithm skills in deploying an RBAC policy by assigning the mined roles to the users.
As perspective of this work, we consider investigating some techniques of preprocessing the compared sets of roles, in order to lower the complexity of the solution.
